Rights versus responsibilities: adult children, parental wealth and contested wills by Conway, Heather
Rights versus responsibilities: adult children, parental wealth and
contested wills
Conway, H. (2017). Rights versus responsibilities: adult children, parental wealth and contested wills. Journal of
Social Welfare and Family Law, 39(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2017.1390295
Published in:
Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:05. Apr. 2019
Rights versus Responsibilities: Adult Children, Parental Wealth  
and Contested Wills 
 
Keywords: wills, inheritance, family provision, adult children  
 
The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 allows courts in England 
and Wales to alter the distributive scheme of a will (or intestacy allocation), where 
certain statutory criteria are met (see generally Douglas, 2014). Applications are 
restricted to specific relatives and dependants of the deceased (listed in s 1(1) of the 
Act), who must demonstrate that the will (or intestacy) failed to make “reasonable 
financial provision” (1975 Act, s 1(2)). Success is not guaranteed, and courts must apply 
a range of both general and category specific factors when assessing individual claims 
(1975 Act, s 3(1) and ss 3(2)-(4) respectively). The recent ruling of the Supreme Court 
in Ilott v The Blue Cross Society [2017] UKSC 17; [2017] 1 FLR 1717 (also known as 
Ilott v Mitson) ends a long-running legal saga, involving an adult daughter who had been 
excluded from her mother’s will. This is the first time that a family provision case has 
reached the highest court in the UK; but while this particular litigation is now over, and 
the right outcome (in the author’s opinion) more or less reached on the facts, important 
issues remain.  
 
The facts of the case are well-known, and can be summarised briefly. Heather Ilott and 
her widowed mother, Melita Jackson, had been estranged since 1978 when Heather left 
home to be with, and subsequently marry, a man that her mother disapproved of. 
Mother and daughter never reconciled (there had been several futile attempts over the 
years), and when Melita executed her final will in April 2002, she left her entire estate to 
three animal charities that she had no lifetime connection to. Melita wrote to her 
daughter, informing her that she would inherit nothing; Heather replied, accepting this. 
When Melita died in 2004, The Blue Cross, RSPB and RSPCA were gifted a net estate of 
£486,000. Heather Ilott, then aged 44, was mother to five children, had not worked 
since the birth of her first child in 1983 and was living in a 3-bedroom property rented 
from a Housing Association. Her husband worked part-time, and the family were 
dependent on state benefits to meet basic living expenses.  
 
What followed was a lengthy legal battle. In 2007, District Judge Million ruled that the 
deceased had not made reasonable financial provision for her daughter under the 1975 
Act, and awarded Heather £50,000 from the estate. Dissatisfied with the amount, she 
appealed; however, Eleanor King J set aside the decision, citing no failure to make 
reasonable financial provision ([2009] EWHC 3114 (Fam); [2010] 1 FLR 1613). The 
Court of Appeal ruled in Heather’s favour in 2011 ([2011] EWCA Civ 346; [2012] 2 FLR 
170) and remitted the quantification issue back to the High Court which upheld the 
District Judge’s award of £50,000 ([2014] EWHC 542 (Fam); [2015] 1 FLR 291). Heather 
appealed that decision to the Court of Appeal, which raised the amount to £143,000 to 
allow her to purchase the family home, with an option to draw upon a further £20,000 to 
supplement her state benefits ([2015] EWCA 797; [2015] 2 FLR 1490). This triggered a 
final appeal by the charities, to the Supreme Court. However, in March 2017, the seven 
Supreme Court judges- in a unanimous ruling- restored the original award of £50,000, 
concluding that the District Judge had not made the fundamental errors of principle 
alleged by the Court of Appeal when it effectively tripled the original award. In short, 
District Judge Million had been entitled to take account of both the lengthy estrangement 
and the daughter’s lack of expectation of inheriting from her mother, and to limit the 
award made on this basis. The Court of Appeal had also erred in suggesting that the 
District Judge had settled on £50,000 without considering the impact on the daughter’s 
benefits; he had addressed this issue in his judgment, but had simply settled on a less 
generous award than the Court of Appeal might have made.     
 
Several points are noteworthy (see also Conway, 2017). First, the 1975 Act creates a 
discretionary system bounded by discrete legislative parameters; different judges can 
reach fundamentally different conclusions on the same set of facts, as the Ilott litigation 
demonstrates perfectly. Second, despite being something that courts try to avoid in the 
family law arena, conduct can be relevant in claims under the 1975 Act- and few would 
dispute that the enduring estrangement was a highly relevant factor in Ilott, and one 
which should have influenced the final outcome. Third, family provision claims involving 
contested wills stand at the intersection of two competing values: testamentary freedom 
versus the obligation to provide for one’s family and dependants. However, the Supreme 
Court judgment in Ilott suggests a renewed emphasis on the former, and that the 
deceased’s expressed wishes should carry significant weight in cases such as this; as 
Lord Hughes observed, “the order under appeal would give little if any weight…to the 
testator’s very clear wishes” ([2017] UKSC 17 at [46]). Finally, named beneficiaries in a 
will do not have to justify their selection or demonstrate some sort of financial need 
when opposing family provision claims; the simple fact is that they were chosen by the 
deceased. And, in what can only be viewed as good news for charities, who rely heavily 
on bequests in wills, Lord Hughes in Ilott rejected the notion that the three animal 
charities here did not have a “competing need” and would “not be prejudiced” by a 
generous award to daughter, as the Court of Appeal had suggested ([2017] UKSC 17 at 
[46] citing comments at [2015] EWCA 797 at [60]).      
 
More specifically, the Ilott litigation raises the broader issue of where ‘independent’ adult 
children- ie. those who are economically self-sufficient or, at least, capable of earning a 
living, and who were not financially dependent on a now deceased parent (even if in 
financial need)- fit within the current succession law narrative. Family provision claims 
by independent adult children have always been one of the most contentious aspects of 
the 1975 Act, for all sorts of reasons (Conway, 2015). These include the absence of a 
pre-existing financial tie; the fact that reasonable financial provision for adult children 
(like every category of applicant under the 1975 Act, with the exception of surviving 
spouses or civil partners) is limited to “maintenance” under s 1(2)(b); and courts only 
having one, inherently limited specific factor to weigh here: namely, the “manner in 
which the applicant was being, or...might expect to be, educated or trained” (1975 Act, s 
3(3)). The Court of Appeal judgments in Ilott were seen as turning points, signifying that 
adult children who had been disinherited (whether wholly or partly) could succeed and 
be given a significant award, despite not having been financially reliant on their dead 
parent (Holland, 2012; Douglas, 2016). However, the Supreme Court ruling suggests 
otherwise, and that independent adult children who lack ‘reasonable financial provision’ 
will probably receive much less generous awards than the Court of Appeal gave Heather 
Ilott. It also emphasises that financial need is not enough, Lord Hughes describing it as 
“a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an order” ([2017] UKSC 17 at [19]); and 
even where the applicant’s needs were obvious (as in the present case, where the 
daughter was living in very straitened financial circumstances), these might not be met 
in full. Other demands on the estate, as well as the relationship between the applicant 
and the deceased, could act as limiting factors.  
 
The fact that Heather Ilott and her family were reliant on state benefits was another 
central feature of this particular litigation. In deciding that the deceased’s will had failed 
to make reasonable financial provision for her daughter, Sir Nicholas Wall P in the first 
Court of Appeal ruling rejected any notion that “a claim under the [1975] Act can 
properly be used to relieve the State of the obligation to support an applicant” (2011] 
EWCA Civ 346 at [14]). And when the addressing the issue of quantification, both 
District Judge Million and the Court of Appeal in its second ruling in Ilott were cognisant 
of the £16,000 eligibility threshold for mean-tested benefits, structuring their awards to 
preserve Housing and Council Tax Benefits as a significant part of the family’s net annual 
income (something that the Supreme Court did not query). One might question whether, 
in an era of reduced public spending and ongoing welfare reforms, Melita Jackson should 
have been able to leave an estate worth almost half a million pounds to three animal 
welfare charities while her daughter and her family survived almost exclusively on 
benefits and a small sum of savings. As Lady Hale pointed out in Ilott, our succession 
law “has not, or not yet, recognised a public interest in expecting or obliging parents to 
support their adult children so as to save the public money” ([2017] UKSC 17 at [65]). 
Replacing state provision with estate provision in cases such as these would be 
extremely controversial, raising complex issues of law and social policy. Whether or not 
that debate occurs sometime in the future remains to be seen.  
 
Dr Heather Conway 
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